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ARCTIC

VOL 51, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 1998) P. 262-279

Justifying Public Decisions in Arctic Oil and Gas Development:
American and Russian Approaches
NICHOLAS E. FLANDERS,1 REX V. BROWN,2 YELENA ANDRE'EVA3 and OLEG LARICHEV3
(Received 28 February 1997; accepted in revised form 29 January 1998)

ABSTRACT. Government resource decisions in the Arctic typically involve complex issues; multiple criteria are used to choose

among alternatives. This complexity is even greater with petroleum development because of concerns about national energy
security, environmental impacts, and economic development. Two decision-aiding techniques may help decision makers clarify

their decisions to themselves, the stakeholders, and the general public. The Russian qualitative technique seeks to reduce the
number of criteria and find alternative options that may be better than the initial ones. The Western quantitative technique seeks
to measure the decision maker* s judgement about the utility and certainty of each option. These techniques are applied to two case

studies: a decision about gas pipeline routing on the Yamal Peninsula, Russia, and a tool for evaluating applications for
development permits on the North Slope of Alaska. The qualitative method is easier to use and may be the best model for people
who use numbers infrequently or want to make a claim based on rights. The quantitative method did well at preserving detail and

incorporating uncertainty. Both approaches helped to reduce the apparent complexity of the decisions.

Key words: oil and gas, decision analysis, Yamal Peninsula, Badami, Niakuk
RÉSUMÉ. Les décisions gouvernementales concernant les ressources dans l'Arctique mettent le plus souvent enjeu des questions
complexes; un grand nombre de critères sont utilisés en vue de choisir parmi différentes options. Cette complexité s'accroît dans
le cas de l'exploitation pétrolière en raison des problèmes entourant la sécurité nationale de l'énergie, les retombées environnementales

et le développement économique. Deux techniques d' aide à la décision peuvent inciter les décideurs à clarifier leurs décisions pour

eux-mêmes, pour les parties intéressées et pour le grand public. La technique qualitative russe cherche à réduire le nombre de
critères et à trouver des solutions de rechange qui pourraient être meilleures que les mesures initiales. La technique quantitative
occidentale cherche à mesurer le jugement du décideur sur l'utilité et la certitude de chaque option. Ces techniques sont appliquées

à deux études de cas: une décision concernant le tracé d'un gazoduc dans la presqu'île de Iamal en Russie, et un outil permettant

d'évaluer les demandes de permis d'exploitation sur le versant Nord de l'Alaska. La méthode qualitative est plus facile à utiliser
et peut être le meilleur modèle pour des individus qui n'ont pas l'habitude des chiffres ou qui veulent établir une revendication
fondée sur des droits. La méthode quantitative réussit bien à préserver le détail et à intégrer l'incertitude. Les deux approches
aidaient à réduire la complexité apparente des décisions.

Mots clés: pétrole et gaz, analyse des décisions, presqu'île Iamal, Badami, Niakuk
Traduit pour la revue Arctic par Nésida Loyer.
INTRODUCTION

development and operation. Instead, a nascent environmental

movement held up exploitation for several years. Only the

The world's desire for oil and gas has led to the exploration
Arab oil boycott in 1974 convinced the United States Conand development of fields in the remote corners of the
earth.
gress
to remove all environmental roadblocks and allow the

The importance to developed economies of petroleum
for
construction
of the Trans- Alaska Pipeline System. In Russia,
transportation, electrical generation, and temperature the
control
central government has decided to develop gas fields on
has made supervision of these resources matters of national
the Yamal Peninsula because of a national need for foreign

and international security. However, development hasexchange.
proved
This decision was made despite an expert commiscontroversial in areas where the natural environmentsion
is conreport that raised serious environmental and indigenous
sidered particularly valuable or vulnerable.
rights concerns.
The development of petroleum fields in the Arctic is aWhether
case
to develop new fields in the Arctic, and under

in point. The world-class discovery of the Prudhoewhat
Bay oil
conditions, has become a national and international
field in Alaska should have been followed by immediate
issue. The terms of this debate involve complex concerns tied
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One component
was to review and evaluate available
up with multiple factors that must be taken into account.
A
for analyzing and guiding the decision-making
clear-cut answer rarely emerges even when "themethods
national
process.
In this component, we compared a quantitative
interest" is considered paramount. A major difficulty
derives
approach
familiar in the West with a Russian qualitative
precisely from defining what the national interest
is. This
complexity is true of many environmental debates, approach.
but be- Each approach organizes the data, knowledge, and
the decision makers would normally use in
comes most obvious when, as in the Arctic, the value
issuejudgements
pits
fundamental needs of the economy and society,a structured,
such as transparent way that clarifies the options, arguments, and implied decision. Both approaches are intended to
transportation, against fundamental symbols of environmenenhance the perceptions of individual decision makers. They
tal purity, such as the sparsely inhabited polar regions.

are not attempts at objective analyses. Both methods, espe-

The Need for a Reviewable Rationale
The need for a reviewable rationale now exists in both
Russia and the United States. The need in the United States

cially the quantitative one, have been widely used throughout
the world to make sounder public and other decisions and to

communicate their grounds and assumptions to interested
parties (Brown, 1987; Larichev et al., 1995).

The other component of the research was to develop these
approaches
into a concrete methodology adapted specifically
mental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. Alaska was the site of
to
Arctic
natural
resource decisions and to test them on real
perhaps the first environmental impact review, which prehas existed since at least the passage of the National Environ-

dated NEPA by almost a decade (O'Neill, 1994). NEPA, as cases in Siberia and Alaska, both past and present. The
well as several acts that have followed, requires a multi- Russian team, Andre' eva and Larichev, carried out the fieldagency and public review of the environmental impacts of a work and qualitative decision analysis of the Yamal case.
proposed federal action. Single agencies continue to make Everyone participated in the fieldwork associated with the
decisions about those actions, but they must explain theirAlaskan permitting case, but the American and Russian
preference and fully answer objections put forth by otherteams carried out separate analyses according to their respective quantitative and qualitative methods.
agencies and the public.
In Russia, the situation is now similar. In Soviet times,
We discuss oil and gas development in the Arctic as an
many Arctic problems were declared "secret" for militaryexample of major natural resource decisions and the role of
reasons. Central ministries were the dominant decision mak- decision aids in clarifying how those decisions are made. We
ers. Now, the government must explain decisions about then give the Russian and American case studies. The former

Arctic resources to the general population and active groups. addresses a single decision: whether to pipe gas from the
The decisions must be well prepared, logical, and rational to Yamal Peninsula over the land or under the sea. The latter
establish why the selected option is the best. The need to use addresses a class of decisions: what procedure federal regudecision analysis is new for government administrators in lators should adopt in deciding whether to permit oil and gas

Russia, where the tradition of authoritarian rule is strong.construction projects in Alaska. Finally, we discuss general
Every application of decision analysis has special valueimplications for the Arctic natural resource decision process.
under Russian conditions: the analysis must continually demonstrate its usefulness to all participants in real decisionBACKGROUND:
making processes.
ARCTIC
OIL
AND GAS DEVELOPMENT
In the United States, despite a longer history of open
decision making, resource decisions in the Arctic still appear
to be ad hoc or politically motivated. In either case, a broadly Russia
understandable, reviewable rationale is missing. The result
Soviet gas development during the 1970s and 1980s was
can be political and legal battles in which the facts and public
interest are buried beneath slogans and simplified images.a specific effort to create a "gas bridge" between the present
Clarification of a decision, therefore, can improve the deci- use of oil to produce energy and a nuclear and coal future.
sion-making process: the decision maker can show that theGustaf son (1989) argues that the development of gas was
decision was based on full consideration of the issues, and the necessary following many years in which the centrally planned
public and stakeholders can see where the key issues lie. economy needed expanding oil production to survive. The
Because knowledge of the Arctic is generally lacking at the opening of the Western Siberian fields and the construction of
national level in most nations, clarity can result in both better pipelines that would carry gas to Western Europe transformed the industry. Gas produced 40% of export earnings by
decisions and a better-informed public.
the late 1980s. The Soviet Union expanded gas production by
50% in five years starting in 1980-81, an expansion that
The Structure of This Study
required a huge commitment of resources and development in
This paper considers how natural resource decisions, Arctic areas. The original idea, held in the late 1970s, had
particularly related to oil and gas development, can bebeen to develop the northern fields simultaneously with
clarified, justified, or improved. The research had two prin- Urengoy, Russia' s largest gas field. The cost of development,
the lack of foreign capital, and the sudden decision to expand
cipal components.
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the
that the coastal plain could be explored an
gas production dictated that all resources be aimed
atpossibility
the
developed.
large, more southern field. Thus, the development
of
Allowing oil development in a wildlife refuge provided a
Yamburg and Yamal, the northern fields, was postponed.
By the late 1980s, when the more northern fields
wereenvironmental cause, and environmental groups
powerful
needed to continue meeting targets, conditions had changed.
staged an effective campaign against development. In 1991,
In 1989, a report from a state expert panel raised Congress
questions
voted against ANWR development. The decision
was not
final, however. Both sides, environmentalists and
about the environmental consequences of gas pipeline
construction on the Yamal Peninsula (Expert Commission,
1989).see permitting decisions on smaller fields as skirindustry,
This report held up construction of the pipeline thatmishes
would
preliminary to another ANWR battle.
carry gas from the Yamal fields (Fig. 1). Then the collapse
of and regional governments have also benefited
The state

the Soviet Union and the ensuing economic turmoil
interfrom
North Slope development. Since 1977, Alaska has
vened. In 1993, it was apparent that the income from
earned gas
over 80% of its income from the oil industry. As
production was a necessity for the Russian economy,production
but gas declines on the North Slope, state revenues will
production had actually declined. President Yeltsin made
theNorth Slope Borough taxes both real estate and
fall. The
decision to develop the pipeline and open the fields
for
personal
property, which means that it receives revenue on
production. National economic security overrode other
the convalue of both the lease-hold and the equipment at the oil

siderations. The only question that remained was
which
fields.
The borough has also taken on substantial debt. Its
pipeline route would be used to move the gas to European
future ability to pay its creditors depends upon continuing oil
markets. The pressure to develop these fields increased
as gaswithin the borough.
production

production continued to fall in 1994 and 1995.

But national environmental groups, some with international backing, have begun to play a role familiar in Western

DECISION ANALYSIS

petroleum development cases. Those responsible for both
development and regulation now find themselves in Decision
a posi- analysis is a broad paradigm for the systemat
tion where their decisions require justification toevaluation
a much of alternative actions, based on all available infor
broader audience than during the Soviet period.
The United States

mation, as a basis for choice among them. Its purpose
normally to make decisions better and clearer. Its inpu
capture the knowledge and judgement of decision make

their perception of what the options are, what the options'
In December 1968, an oil company discovered the
largest
consequences
might be, and the relative importance of crite
oil field ever found in North America at Prudhoe Bay
oncharacterizing
the
ria
these consequences. The class of decisio
North Slope of Alaska (Fig. 2). A pipeline was needed
to here concerns two or more discrete options that c
involved
transport the oil to the ice-free port of Valdez in
bePrince
evaluated according to two or more criteria.
William Sound more than 1000 km away on the southern
Decision analysis has two variants: qualitative and quan
coast. Alaska Native land claims and environmental concerns
titative. Qualitative or categorical decision analysis (CD A
held up construction for almost five years.

relies on natural language and non-numerical categorizati
Congress removed these roadblocks, first by theofpassage
the considerations in a choice. Quantitative or numeri
of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, decision
then by analysis (NDA) represents uncertainty and value
overriding the environmental concerns in response
the of numbers and combines them in a quantitati
thetoform
Arab oil boycott of 1973-74. The United States, dependent
model (derived from statistical decision theory). The qualita
on oil imports, had been vulnerable to the boycott.
A large
tive
analysis has been associated with Russian decisio
field on domestic territory held the attraction of regaining
analysis; the quantitative, with Western decision makin
control over the country's supply. The boycott experience
The two approaches may draw out different aspects of t
convinced the American public that domestic sources
oil
same of
problem.
were important to the national weal. From the time that the
pipeline began to carry oil in 1977 until the late 1980s,
The when
Russian Approach
lower prices and field depletion led to declining domestic
production, the United States produced over half of the
oil it
Descriptions
of the methodological base of CDA are in
consumed (Flanders, 1993). The development of the
pipeline
Lariche
v ( 1 987, 1 992) and Larichev and Moshkovich ( 1 997).

and the North Slope fields appeared to be a successful
CDA tries to use the natural language of the decision maker,

national policy.

active parties, and potential experts to structure a problem.

In the 1980s, however, the environment reappeared
The goalasofastructuring is to define the criteria to be evaluated
counterconcern. The conflict settled on the coastal
of
forplain
the initially
given options. For each criterion, an evaluathe Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). Congress
tion scalehad
is constructed with a small number of quality grades

understood the potential of the refuge for petroleum
whenfrom best to worst. These are drawn from natural
ranging
officially recognizing it in the Alaska National Interest
Lands
language,
for example, "no damage to the environment";
Conservation Act of 1980: Section 1002 of the Act left
open damage to the environment"; "major damage to
"moderate
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FIG. 1. Proposed pipeline routes and gas fields, Yamal Peninsula, Russia. The sea route (solid line) crosses Baydaratskaya Bay from the Bovanenkova field.
The land route (dashed line) follows the proposed railway line around the bay.
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FIG. 2. Major oil fields, North Slope, Alaska, USA. The Niakuk and Badami fields are noted by underlining and italics.

equal, which of these two options would you prefer when they
the environment." When major measurement difficulties

differ on these two (or one) criteria? When comparing the
exist, relative (rather than absolute) evaluations of the options
are recommended (Oseredko et al., 1982; Huber and Huber,
reference options, the decision maker goes through the pair-

1987).
Larichev and Moshkovich (1997) describe the special
methods CDA uses for comparing alternatives through these

verbal evaluations. Pair-wise compensation is one such
method: used when the initially given options are few; it
compares the options qualitatively, pulling out their relative
merits and deficiencies. At every stage of the decision proc-

ess, CDA helps the decision maker reduce the decision to a
more manageable size. For instance, evaluations on criteria
that are not really different are eliminated. By this means, the

number of evaluative criteria for comparison is reduced.
This method then tries to find a condition where the

wise comparisons and, for each pair, chooses one option's
disadvantages over those of the other. If all the disadvantages
of one option are found to be less harmful than those of the
other, the problem is solved. When comparing the two reference options, the decision maker performs a psychologically

valid operation (Larichev, 1992).
When only doing qualitative comparisons, one can end up
with a situation of noncomparability. Noncomparability occurs when some evaluations are better for the first option and
some better for the second. To resolve this problem, a new,
more promising option is sought that could be better than the
two initially given. The method used helps the decision maker

disadvantages of one option outweigh the disadvantages of
to find the minimum changes needed in the evaluations of
the other. First, the decision maker ranks the disadvantages of
existing options to create a new, better alternative.
the two options separately. Then special reference options are In Russia, as in the United States, many active groups
created and presented to the decision maker. The options haveparticipate in Arctic-related decisions, including local authe same number of criteria as the original problem, but they
thorities, the local population, and the company responsible
only retain the original, real differences in one or two criteria.
for construction. In the post-Soviet period, reaching agree-

For the other criteria, both options put forward the best (or
ment among all active groups is a necessity. Decision analysis

worst) evaluations. The decision maker is then asked toplays a special role in Russian Arctic problems by examining
choose between the two reference options. Put another way,the positions of different active groups, identifying the favored
the decision maker is asked: Given the other criteria being
alternative for each group, and preparing for negotiations
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among them. The same analysis is carried out with
all the
developing
the project. The Russian authors of this paper
have been are
working with various stakeholders in the decision.
different active groups, and differences in positions
analyzed. New options are developed with the idea of
During
finding
the development of the project, the idea of straightening the pipeline route by crossing Baydaratskaya Bay (the sea
agreement among groups.

route) received strong support. The second option (the land

The American Approach

route) would cross the Yamal Peninsula to the east of the bay.
The choice has been the subject of bitter discussion between

Numerical decision analysis (NDA) essentially translates
two project institutes over several years. The gas project
institute
Giprospetsgaz in St. Petersburg favored the land
judgement and knowledge relevant to evaluating some
choice
route,etbut
the gas project institute Yusniiprogaz in Donetsk
into a quantitative model (Raiffa, 1968; Zeckhauser
al.,
proposed crossing the bay. Both institutes have
1996). Normally, NDA calculates a numerical value(Ukraine)
for each
option, so that the best option is clear. For example, arguments
probabil-for and against the sea and land routes. The
decision
and the start of pipeline construction were recently
ity and utility values are attached to each possible
conse-

postponed,
partly because of the complexity of this choice.
quence of an option, and the option with the
highest
Thus, the task is one of decision making with two options.
probability-weighted expected utility is logically preferred.

This problem
This type of model often suits a case where uncertainty
is concerns unknown natural conditions, the
interests of different groups influencing the choice, and

critical.

contradictory
appraisals of the alternatives on various criteIn many environmental management decisions, the
critiria,
as
well
as
other
things. For a more detailed description of
cal issue is conflicting objectives, and another common

see Andre'eva et al. (1995).
model often works well. The competing criteria this
arecase,
listed
along with the decision-maker's numerical judgement of
Two
their relative importance. The impact of each option
onOptions
each

criterion is evaluated separately from the importance of each
The two options are the sea route crossing the bay and the
criterion. The preferred option is the one with the highest

land
The following distinguishing characteristics or
importance-weighted impact. High impact in areas
ofroute.
little
were initially included in the analysis: (1) length of
importance can balance out small impact in areascriteria
of great
the route; (2) terms of construction; (3) time for construction;
importance.
(4) cost
of construction; (5) impact on the environment; (6)
An NDA approach is normally comprehensive: it
should
characterize all considerations (values and assessments)
risk of arelpipeline rupture accident; (7) consequences of a
pipeline For
rupture accident; (8) time needed to recover from an
evant to a choice, even if at a highly aggregate level.
and (9) uncertain and unknown factors. With
example, an importance-weighted impact modelaccident;
does not
respect
to (6), the option of crossing Baydaratskaya Bay
attempt to reduce the number of criteria per se, though
it may
involves unique features that could cause an accident: (a) the
group them into fewer classes.
The NDA may use qualitative assessments andinstability
naturalof the shore because of permafrost processes and
sea ice impact;
language preparatory to developing numerical values.
This (b) the rupture of or damage to the pipeline
qualitative step may prove all that is necessary, andthrough
leadersiceinscouring; and (c) the capability of icebergs to
the field recommend it.
reach Baydaratskaya Bay. With respect to (9), the analysis
points out that the decision must be made under conditions of
The differences between the two approaches may be seen
through specific applications. The literature is largely limited major uncertainty because the construction start date has
to comparisons of verbal and numerical treatments of the been set for the near future.
uncertainty aspect of decision analysis (Erev and Cohen,
1990; Rapoport et al., 1990; Hamm, 1991; Wallsten et al., Active Groups
1993).
Before comparing the two options, we must analyze who
will make the choice and how. A single decision maker is not
THE RUSSIAN CASE:
likely to make the decision because of the high project cost.
GAS TRANSPORT FROM YAMAL
On the contrary, several institutions and organizations, or
"active groups," are taking part directly or indirectly in the
decision. They are: (1) RAO Gazprom, which ordered the
Background

As noted, the development of the Yamal gas fields has
become a matter of national importance. However, this devel-

opment has many unresolved problems. An essential one is
the choice between two routes connecting the gas fields to the
existing gas pipeline system. A senior Russian official wanted
to get reliable confirmation that RAO Gazprom's preliminary
choice was the best. RAO Gazprom is the joint stock company

development of the project and must evaluate and confirm the
pipeline route, and its operational division in North Siberia,

Nadymgazprom; (2) the two project research institutes that
developed the two options; (3) two government ministries,
the Ministry of the Economy, which evaluates the project's
economics, and the Russian Federation Committee for the
Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources, which
evaluates its ecological effects; (4) the local authorities in the
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1. CDA analysis of gas pipeline routes from the Yamal
Yamal region, who must give their agreement to oneTABLE
option
Peninsula (Russia).
of the pipeline; and (5) local communities and representatives

of Native peoples, whose territory and resources will be

Criteria
Sea Option Land Option
affected by the construction of the pipeline system. The
active

groups have different interests, and one might expect that
the
Cost
Csea
CJ
groups would support different options.
Ecological impact Esea E,and
Probability of accident Psea Pkmé
Consequences of accident Aiea Aland
The Application of Russian CD A to the Yamal Case
Reliability of gas supply Rsea /?w
Uncertain and unknown factors Usea Uiand

It is logical to take into account only the criteria for which
one can find an essential difference between the options.
For
1 The
favored option according to each criterion is indicated b

example, the preliminary estimate shows that the required
bold italics, e.g., Cw indicates that the land option is less cost
construction time is 5 -7 years for both options. The unstable

national economic situation can affect the starting
thetime.
two Yamal pipeline options. The greater uncertainty an
Because this problem exists for both options, the analysis
lessercan
reliability of gas supply for the sea option were wor
ignore the problem, as it is not relevant to a choice between
than the ecological impact from the land option. But t

the two. Route length, time of construction, and negative
terms of consequences of an accident under the land opt

construction can be considered under the criterion "cost."

The terms of construction can also be considered under

were worse than the greater probability of an accident un
the sea option. The research team, working with the decisi

"probability of an accident," since difficult conditions can
makers and experts, undertook the development of a n
affect the quality of construction and hence increase themore promising option from the existing ones.

likelihood of a future accident. The relevant criteria and their A method for aiding strategic choice called ASTRID
evaluations are shown in Table 1 :
(Berkeley et al., 1991) was employed to define a new a

potentially best option. In the case of incomparability
1. Cost The cost of crossing Baydaratskaya Bay (Csea) ASTRIDA proposes the modification of one existing opti
was determined by a foreign firm that is ready to That is, the method asks the question: what needs to

construct this part of the pipeline. The initial estimates changed in one option to make it clearly equal to or better t
show that Csea is a little higher than CUd.
the other option? Below is the analysis corresponding to th
2. Ecological impact. Both options would have a negative interests of RAO Gazprom.

impact on the environment. Though the sea option
A new sea route option resulted from the search for wa
contains some uncertainty, ecological impact is much to change the characteristics of the sea route. Discussio
larger for the land option: a land pipeline would cross a
lot of land and many rivers.
3. Probability of accident Because of unstable shores and

with experts suggested ways in which the negative aspects
that option could be removed:

To eliminate problems from seashore instability, the pipel

the possibility of ice scouring, the probability of an could be put through special shafts at a safe distance from t
accident is higher for the sea option.

4. Consequences of the accident An accident on land is
usually connected with an explosion and destruction of

the environment. A sea accident would not cause an

shore. This construction would incur additional costs (Cshaft

To avoid damage to the pipeline from ice scouring, t
pipeline could be laid in special trenches 1.5-2 m deep.

these trenches would be deeper than those called for in th
explosion, but the gas would rise through the water and
project plan, the costs (Cinches) would also be additional.
cracks in the ice. The land option is clearly worse.
To eliminate the danger from icebergs, a special observa5 . Reliability of gas supply. The repair of the pipeline after tion service and a ship to drag an iceberg away would be us
an accident would require much more time under the The cost of the service and ship is denoted by Cice.
sea option, particularly since the bay is ice-free for only
Adding these features to the sea option creates a ne

60-70 days per year. The sea option is clearly worse. alternative with an element of uncertainty that is approxi
6. Uncertain and unknown factors. Many more uncertain
mately equal (from the point of view of the experts) to that
and unknown factors are connected with the realization
the traditional land option. With the development of a spe
of the unique project of crossing Baydaratskaya Bay. repair service for the underwater pipes, the reliability of
The sea option is clearly worse.
gas supply could be made equal. Thus, no significant differ

ences would exist between the sea and land routes except co
These comparative, qualitative evaluations are practically
and ecological impact. The cost of the new sea option (C
all we can measure; other qualitative measurements are moreCshaft + Ctrenches + Cice) would clearly be higher and the l
difficult. How does one draw conclusions with such weakoption would still create greater environmental destruction
measurements?
But now the comparison can be considered as one betwe
As noted, CDA methods do not guarantee that pair-wise
higher costs (sea) and lower environmental protection (land
comparisons of the disadvantages of two alternatives will
The comparison between two factors presents a real, crucia
always lead to a clear preference. This situation resulted with
choice to be made.
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have
a significantly larger impact. The effect of alternative
Analogous analyses were made from the positionstoof
other
active groups. The development of a new option was
inputs
useful
by the same or other evaluators could be readily
calculated.
in this case, too. With regard to the two initial options,
only
the positions of the local authorities and local population
were clear: they supported the sea option. The new sea option
was also more attractive to the Russian Federation Commit-

THE AMERICAN CASE: A PERMITTING PROCEDURE
FOR OIL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

tee for the Protection of the Environment and to Nadym-

gazprom. But, the positions of Gazprom and the Ministry of
Setting
the Economy in the final, crucial choice presented above were
influenced by the difficult financial situation in Russia. The
The Russian case addresses how to help make a single,
Ministry was inclined toward the less costly land route.

still-active decision. The American case addresses how to

The Influence of Recommendations

develop a reusable procedure for a class of future decisions.

A major recurring decision facing U.S. regulators with
Our report, with the recommendations presented above, responsibility for Arctic development is whether to permit

was given to RAO Gazprom. At that time, the original seaAlaskan oil construction projects, with or without restricoption was more attractive to the majority of the organiza- tions. A number of parties, including industry and environtion's managers. The intention to begin pipeline constructionmental groups, have been concerned that controversial

was strong, and they had expected that the report woulddecisions - such as whether to allow oil drilling in the
support this option. Instead, the report added doubts about itsAlaskan National Wildlife Refuge - are often subject to
arbitrary and unpredictable pressures, for example, major
acceptability, and construction was postponed. One reason
was the uncertain and unknown factors described by theshifts in the political climate. They have clamored for a

standardized, "scientific" procedure that would not be
report. During the delay, new investigations were undertaken
on the problem of seashore instability and ice regimes insusceptible to manipulation.
Baydaratskaya Bay. These studies were an objective confir- The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (CoE) Alaska District

mation that the available data were insufficient to ensure safehas primary responsibility for evaluating permit applications,
using the wetlands guidelines of the Clean Water Act. Typioperations.

That delay has now turned into a cancellation. Market
prices have been too low, problems of investment remain
unresolved, and drilling in an unstable sandy-permafrost

surface still presents complex engineering challenges.
AMOCO, which had a major interest in the area, has pulled
out completely. It appears that the fields will not be developed

until 2005, and liquid natural gas (LNG) ships are under
assessment as an alternative to pipelines for transporting gas
out of the region when development does take place.

cally one analyst within the Regulatory Branch makes a
recommendation, based upon available evidence, through the

Branch Chief to the District Engineer, who confers with
various other federal and state agencies before rendering a
decision.
Research Task

Our research team decided to first test the technical feasibility of our ideas on a past permitting incident: whether to

Possible NDA of the Yamal Case
NDA could be attempted on the same problem. Larichev
et al. (1995), for example, present a hypothetical "importance-weighted impact" model based on the same set of
criteria: cost, ecology, accident risk, etc. However, instead of

presenting the perspective of each active group (as in the
above CD A), the model could represent the view of someone

wishing to decide which pipeline route best served the nation's interest or to argue the case before a public audience.

For example, a responsible citizen or government official
might supply the impact and importance inputs, and the
conclusions would be attributed to that person.

permit British Petroleum (BP) to build a causeway to its
Niakuk oil field in the Arctic Ocean. Though CoE personnel
provided extensive input on specific aspects of the case,
including the criteria that are used in deciding permits, we felt
that the issue was still too controversial to show how their

analysis might have been done. We chose instead to show the
results as ¿/the applicant were putting forward its argument
based upon the categories and definitions of impacts that the
CoE might use. We put together the evaluation described here
entirely from secondary sources. BP, the actual applicant, had
no input.

Niakuk Background

The evaluation scale was from 0 to -100, where 0 is no

impact of any kind, and -100 is the worst plausible impact

In the late 1980s, BP sought permission to develop the

under a particular criterion. On one illustrative set of inputs

Niakuk oil field from an artificial island about 2 km offshore

proposed by a research colleague, the land route scored -20
and the sea route scored -15. So that e valuator apparently

ashore. The Alaska District of CoE gave a conditional permit

favored the less damaging sea route. She considered ecology
to be the most important criterion and assessed the land route

causeway, on the grounds that the proposal did not meet the

in the Beaufort Sea, using a gravel causeway to pipe the oil

that did not allow for the construction of the proposed
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TABLE 2. NDA hypothetical qualitative analysis of Niakuk (Alaska) permit application. Positive consequences are given in b
asterisk ("*") indicates an unacceptable level of impact, and a dagger ("t") indicates that the option is economically impracti
that criterion.

Affected party Type of consequence Causeway Slant drilling Interpretation of Unacceptable Importance
impacts impacts very high impact

General public (environmental concerns)

Fish populations High* Very low 10 years to restore High ♦♦
Animal populations Very low Very low 10 years to restore Low ♦♦♦
Aquatic sites (wetlands) Low Low Comparable to Everglades High ♦ ♦

Other fauna (endangered species) Very low Very low 5% probability of extinction

Water quality Very low Medium* 2 spills over project life Low ♦♦
Wilderness/ecology

National
Oil

State and local

interest

independence

Revenue

Local

High

Very

(royalties)

Low

low

Low
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Very
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low
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$
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to

less
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over
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200
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1
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major

more
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out

species

1

permanent

20%

year

out
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Industry

Niakuk profitability Medium Very lowt $ IB earnings Very lowt ♦♦♦
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Affected Type of Causeway Impacts Slant Drilling Impacts
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hio. 4. NDA hypothetical graphic analysis of Niakuk (Alaska) permit application, using boxes. Impact and import
impact and height importance. The small vertical line indicates an unacceptable or impractical impact. The black
is favored. The cross-hatching indicates that the causeway is favored. An observer or decision maker can readily
small impact on a criterion of great importance and a large impact on an area of less importance. The two bars at
differences in areas.
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Graphic Format

assessment may be. Although uncertainty may be important
for a risk-averse decision maker, if the causeway impacts are
plausibly noas
more uncertain than for slant drilling, the causeFigure 3 expresses essentially all the same judgements
still be preferred. The decision maker can always
Table 2, but quantitatively, in a graphic format, way
andwould
more

discount
the value of very uncertain impacts by making
precisely. The level of impact, positive or negative,
of each
single-number estimates conservative. However, it may be
option on each consequence, is represented by a horizontal
helpful to is
register the uncertainty explicitly, to make clear to
bar. For example, in "fish population," "high" impact
observer
represented by a bar that is long, but not as long asany
a bar
forwhere the "net" impact estimate came from.
Though that
we could not do it here, one could handle this by
the maximum or "very high" impact. (Equivalently,
shading
the0-boxes darker for more certain estimates, or
impact could be given a numerical score on a scale
from
simply
by adding the words "low," "medium," or "high" in a
100, correspondingly defined). The small vertical line
above
column for uncertainty.
the bar labelled "Max" indicates the maximum acceptable
A purely
impact, noted as "high" for "fish population" impact
ofnumerical presentation can incorporate estimates
of uncertainty algebraically. If each impact is assigned a
"causeway" in Table 2, but now more precisely represented
marginagain
of error, e.g., 10 ± 30, an overall margin of error for
as a little less than the width of the box - and therefore
net value of each option can be approximated by a
characterized as "unacceptable." The bar in the finalthe
column
represents importance weight, corresponding to theformula.
number
Note
that "uncertainty" as used here refers to both the
of stars in the last column of Table 2. The long bar for
"fish
doubt of the decision maker toward the given estimate and the
population" corresponds to three stars in Table 2. However,
amount of
possible variation in the particular criteria. On the
it is less high than the bar for "animal population," which
also
whole,
however,
the decision makers were most concerned
got three stars in Table 2, reflecting the greater precision of
about
the
precision
of a given estimate.
Figure 3.

In Figure 4, two dimensions of impact and importance are

combined as the area of the box (that is, as the product of

Live Decision: Badami

impact and importance). This area indicates the net effect of

an option's consequence on that criterion. Thus, the causeway has a significant effect via fish population (as shown by

a large box) because the size of the impact is large and the

BP recently proposed development of another new field on
the North Slope, called Badami. The American team met with
a regulator and used the decision aid to analyze two options

By comparing the total area of boxes favoring causeway
(shown black) with those favoring slant drilling (cross-

under the then active permit request. (BP has subsequently
withdrawn this particular request and has provided a new
one). In the plan to develop Badami, BP proposed several

hatched), we have an indication of which option is preferred.

innovations that would have reduced environmental impact.

Since the causeway area is clearly much larger than the slant

These include a small footprint for the drilling pad that takes

drilling area, the causeway option should be accepted, ac-

advantage of slant drilling, transportation of materials to the
site during winter to eliminate the need for a road, and chilled
rather than heated oil in the pipeline. One reading of this effort

importance is substantial (but not as high as some others.)

cording to this example. One can see by eye that the greater
area favoring causeway is due largely to the high impact and
high importance attached to three measures of industry profitability. This evaluation is what one might expect from an oil

company applicant. The regulators do not have to accept
these importance weights, of course; they can substitute their

own assessments when coming to a decision.
Although numbers can communicate the same assessments, these graphic representations can be better for communication. Whereas the numbers themselves may be difficult
for a lay person to understand, the relative shape and size of

suggests that in addition to making the Badami field more
harmonious with the landscape, the approach could set a
precedent for development in ANWR.
The regulator identified the pipeline construction plan as
the key issue in deciding on the permit. The pipeline would

have connected the field with the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System. The proposer, BP, wanted to bury the pipeline
completely, even at river crossings. Traditionally, pipelines
cross rivers on bridges, so completely burying the pipeline
would have been new. Buried pipelines cause a problem by

the different boxes can convey the important differences.
Finally, the boxes may avoid conveying a false precision.
Whereas the decision maker may not intend to imply a
precision of, say, 35 (as opposed to 34 or 36), the box diagram
does not necessarily convey anything but a fairly rough

dissipating heat into the surrounding permafrost, causing the
development of thermokarsts around the pipe. For this reason,
pipelines are generally kept aboveground in permafrost areas.
BP proposed new technology to overcome this problem.

Handling Uncertainty

scour depth. Sagbends, dips in the pipeline on either side of
the river crossing, would be set back from the river bank far

estimate.

This graphical format does not capture uncertainty (nor

does the qualitative format). A single quantity represents

each impact prediction, regardless of how suspect the

At river crossings, the pipeline would be put below ice

enough to allow a gradual transition to a deeper substream
level and avoid the effects from bank erosion. The pipeline
would require four major and multiple minor creek crossings.
The regulator felt that consideration should be concentrated
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TABLE 3. NDA hypothetical numerical analysis of Badami (Alaska) permit decision.
Completely Buried Buried Except at Crossings Advantage

Consequence, impact on Importance1 Impact Uncertainty2 Contribution3 Impact Uncertainty2 Contribution3 Buried
Special aquatic sites impact -0.3 15 0.15 -4.5 7 0.15 -2.1 -2.4
Anadromous fish - Sea -1 5 0.15 -5 5 0.15 -5
Anadromous fish - River -1 5 0.15 -5 5 0.15 -5

0
0

Anadromous fish - positive effect 1 50 0.15 50 45 0.15 45 5
Other fish/aquatics -0.3 5 0.15 -1.5 5 0.15 -1.5 0
Wildlife
-0.3
5
0.15
Marine mammals -0.3 5

-1.5
10
0.15 -1.5

Other

-1

endangered

Ecosystem

species

-1

5

0.15

5

0.15

-5

5

0.15
-3
1.5
5 0.15 -1.5 0

-5

5

0.15

0.15

-5

-5

0

0

Permafrost integrity -1 15 0.8 -15 5 0.15 -5 -10
Physical properties -0.7 5 0.15 -3.5 5 0.15 -3.5 0
Circulation -0.15 5 0.15 -0.75 5 0.15 -0.75 0
Erosion, accretion -0.5 10 0.5 -5 5 0.15 -2.5 -2.5
Turbidity -0.1 5 0.15 -0.5 5 0.15 -0.5 0
Ice dynamics -0.5 5 0.15 -2.5 5 0.15 -2.5 0
Oil pollution -0.7 5 0.3 -3.5 5 0.15 -3.5 0
Other water quality -0.15 5 0.15 -0.75 5 0.15 -0.75 0
Soil quality -0.5 5 0.15 -2.5 5 0.15 -2.5 0
Fisheries -0.1 5 0.15 -0.5 5 0.15 -0.5 0

Energy
1
15
0.15
15
15
0.15
15
0
Pro-wilderness sentiment -1 40 0.15 -40 40 0.15 -40 0
Native way of life -0.5 5 0.15 -2.5 5 0.15 -2.5 0
State/borough oil finances 0.8 40 0.15 32 40 0.15 32 0
Construction business and employment 0.8 30 0.15 24 30 0.15 24 0
Operations business and employment 0.8 10 0.15 8 10 0.15 8 0
Other state/borough finances 0.2 10 0.15 2 5 0.15 1 1

Other

-0.2

5

Totals

20.89

0.15

-1

15

o'l5

-3

2

Badami income for BP 0.3 20 0.15 6 10 0.15 3 3
Precedent for industry 0.3 50 0.15 15 10 0A5 3 12
Meeting applicant's purpose 0.7 100 0 70 70 0.15 49 21
Precedent for environmentalists -0.3 35 0.15 -10.5 10 0A5 -3 -7.5
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TABLE 4. CD A hypothetical qualitative analysis of Niakuk (Alaska) permitting decision. The italics indicate the major diff
the options.
Evaluation of Alternatives

Groups1 Criteria Causeway Slant Drilling Subsea Pipeline

ABC Impact on the environment Unacceptable2 Acceptable Acceptable
AB Damage to wilderness Big No Small
AB Social consequences - Equally negligible -

ABC Quantity of oil Basic volume Less Equal to basic
C Cost of construction Basic cost $14-30 million more (5-10%) $37 million more (10-15%)

A Oil independence Estimated input Less Equal
ABC Uncertain factors3 A few Very many Many

ABC Reliability of pipeline4 Normal Normal Less

1 Active groups: A = public; B = local authorities; C = oil compan

2 The available knowledge confirms a real danger to the environme
3 A lack of knowledge for effective realization of the alternatives.
4 Risk of accident: detecting and eliminating.

Most of these secondary
criteria,
though important
the
differences between the two remaining
options
were
foundtoin
the cost of construction, the number
uncertain
factors,
and
Arctic, are not of
Arctic-specific:
they would
be important
for
public
environmental
decisions
elsewherehad
in the world.
Their
the reliability of the pipeline.
The
buried
pipeline
disadto the
Arctic is a matter of
degree rather
than kind.
vantages in its extra cost and importance
reduced
reliability.
Slant
drilling
For example,
complexity reduction
addresses a problem
that
was disadvantageous in its many
uncertain
factors,
which
is foundrealization.
throughout environmental decision making: how to
might have blocked its effective
make
comparisons would
across several
different
criteria that
At this point, the qualitative
analysis
have
needed
touse
different
measures
incorporate
different levels
of cerknow whether the disadvantages
of
the and
buried
pipeline
could
(e.g., Committee
on the Human
Dimensions The
of Global
have been made at least equal tainty
to those
of slant
drilling.
Change,
1 994:
1 8). However, had
decisionsaabout
Arctic resources
buried pipeline, according to
the
analysis,
number
of
tend to beReducing
more public, because
they are
more of
likely conto be on
advantages over the alternative.
the
cost
land and involveto
more
groupslevel
with divergent
interests.
struction or increasing the public
reliability
the
of slant
Personal clarification
and communication
also important
drilling might have made a buried
pipeline
a betterare
alternative. In any case, the analysistocan
any public
aid policy
thedecision.
decision
Communication
maker
may by
be more
showing where the major differences
difficult for Arctic
lie.
issues because the topics and their impor-

DISCUSSION: COMPARING APPROACHES

tance may be farther from the knowledge of most people,
even those involved in government decision making. The
applicability of a decision tool to a class of decisions, and the

attendant ability to reuse it, will mean that the procedure can
Because actual decision cases are used, an experimental
become part of a management regime and provide a clear and
situation cannot be created in which "treated" and "unconsistent approach to those decisions. A better understand-

treated" parallel cases can be compared. The analyst or
ing
the
on the part of the public is more likely to emerge.
decision maker can only judge that the decision made with
the
Consideration
of alternatives may be more important in the
help of the decision aids was better than it might have been
Arctic because the environment may benefit from or require
otherwise. Does this limitation render a third-party evaluanew technology or approaches. An important corollary to the
consideration of alternatives is whether the methods aid the
tion of decision aids completely impossible? Not entirely.

Secondary criteria can suggest whether a particular technique
search for compromises among groups. Arctic decisions
is better to particular ends. In the case of the Arctic, these
typically involve different interest groups within the same

secondary evaluation criteria can address the characteristic
level of government, among the levels of government, and
needs of decision makers in this region of the globe.

within the larger public. By extension, does one approach or

Decision Issues Important to the Arctic

the other favor particular interestsl This issue also raises
ease of use as a question, since more technical approaches

may favor better-educated or more experienced groups. The
The two methods studied here suggest at least nine deciincorporation of uncertainty is perhaps the most Arcticsion issues: complexity reduction, consideration of alternaspecific issue, because the Arctic environment is charactertives, personal clarification for the decision maker, finding
ized by large seasonal and interannual variation; decision
compromises, favoring of interests, communication, ability
makers have a poorer information base, as less research has
to reuse the method, ease of use, and incorporation of uncerbeen conducted; and oil companies must deal with wellhead

tainty (Table 5).

price swings brought about by the large fixed costs for
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TABLE 5. Comparison of CDA and NDA on aspects of decision making important to Arctic resource decisions.
Criteria Categorical Numerical Importance to Arctic
Dealing with Complexity »Eliminates criteria where no »Seeks numerical value for each •Public ownership of land and

differences exist. criterion on importance and impact environmental characteristics can
• Seeks to reduce some criteria to dollar scales and combination of two. create several interacting issues,
amounts. »Allows direct comparison of • Interest groups can purposely create
• Alters the negative features of one alternatives and criteria through complexity to prolo
alternative to create anew alternative. scores, and suggests a decision. costs.
• Creates "psychologically valid"
binary choices.

Considering Alternatives • Forces consideration of alternatives. • Does not require consideration of • Because most projects are unique,
alternatives, but can suggest them. alternatives are not well known.
• Can consider compensating actions
that are not part of an alternative.

Clarification for the Decision Maker • Focuses on essential differences. • Can point out whether analysis of • The public nature of decisions and
• Forces a decision maker to consider criteria is consistent with "gut" choice the possiblity of litigation require the

alternatives. between alternatives. decision maker to reach a justifiable

• Because the method does not provide decision,
a final decision, decision makers may
not necessarily see the implication of
their evaluation of criteria.

Finding Compromises • Searches for alternative options, • Does not include compromise as an • Multiple stakeholders participate in
including possible compromises. integral part of method, but does allow public decisions.
for trade-offs between criteria and,

thereby, stakeholders.

Favoring Stakeholder Groups • May encourage wider range of »Requires numeracy, which may • Stakeholder groups may differ widely
stakeholder participation. disfavor less educated groups. in education, power, and rights.
• Harder to integrate rights-based
approach.

Communication • Provides clear and quick description • Shows detail about how decision • Public has major involvement in
of the decision problem. maker weighed different criteria and decisions.

•Focuses discussions by reducing their impact. «Public has low knowledge of
unnecessary complexity. • Can discuss numbers and alter them. background and issues.

• Gives permit applicant a template with • Obscuring issues is a potent
which to work. stakeholder tactic.

Ability to Reuse • Requires a new approach to analysis • Applies to a class of pe
for each decision problem. decisions. to unique Arctic issues.

• Can be used as template for permit • Tools can reduce the cos

applications. hoc approaches to environmental
decisions.

Ease of Use • Is easily understandable. • Requires numeracy. »At some decision-making levels,

• May require training for decision educational attainment is low.
maker.

Incorporating Uncertainty • Considers uncertainty as one criterion. • Asks decision maker for estimate of »The Arctic environment is h
• May transform uncertainty to the uncertainty. variable.
dollar cost of removing it. • Provides overall uncertainty for each • Well-head prices ar

alternative. • Unexpected costs may arise.

transportation. Finally, because construction and
operation
usually
involved, each of which may have a distinct conce
often use new techniques, it is difficult to figureor
accurately
stake - or even more than one. Development, primarily
the cost of any project. Prior experience may notconsideration
be available
of economic interests, may concern the
as a guide. Thus, uncertainty is a key issue.
pany carrying out the activity, the local or regional gove
ment, or the federal government. All may have an interes
Complexity Reduction
seeing the development take place, but with enough diffe

ences among them, e.g., taxes versus profits, that they can

While decisions about oil and gas development
in the
be considered
to have the same interest. Complexity can a
Arctic are often portrayed as a battle between development
from defining those differences as aspects of the sam
and the environment, the skirmishes take place
in several
tional
interest. Similarly, the environment is not a si
arenas. Because development takes place on public
land
in
entity.
Development
may improve some aspects of the en

both Russia and the United States, several interest
groups are
ronment,
while negatively affecting others. Finally, with
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Clarification
the United States, the battle often takes place in a legal
forum.
Delay is a tactic, and creating complexity may be a way to
Both methods clarify the decisions. The decision makincrease delay.

with whom we worked in both the United States and
The qualitative approach eliminates much of theers
complexhad a similar experience: after the first iteration on
ity by reducing the question to the bare essential Russia
of differmodel, and after some time to think, they universally
ences. The quantitative method does not reduce the the
complexity
revised
their analyses to reflect what they thought was an
per se, but it brings to bear a common denominator.
A chief

issue between the two methods is whether the numbers

accurate model. In the quantitative approach, the clarificacreated under the quantitative approach are "real": do tion
theycame when the consequences of the modeling were

clear. The decision makers saw a result that was counter to
truly reflect psychological states in which numerical interwhat they thought was the correct decision. That is, thinkvals are equidistant and values placed on different impacts

follow a common scale allowing comparison? Both mething about the individual factors influencing the decision
did not add up to the decision that a decision maker thought
ods, each in their way, reduce complexity and thus achieve
correct. The decision maker then had the option of either
a valuable public goal. This reduction allows both decision
rethinking the individual factors or rethinking the decimakers and the general public who have no firsthand
sion. By forcing consistency, the decision analysis techknowledge of the Arctic to understand what the essential

issues are.

niques can help us avoid many of the decision-making
pathologies that plague ad hoc decisions.
The use of numbers in the analysis would add to the clarity

Consideration of Alternatives

of a decision when scales are carefully constructed. A numerical approach also clarifies by not reducing a complex
The two methods differ considerably in whether they
question such as the environment to a single factor: it mainforce consideration of alternatives. The qualitative aptains and deals with the multiple elements that make up any
proach engenders a search for another alternative that has
not previously been considered. This alternative can bekey
a area of a decision. However, the quantitative approach is
new variant developed by altering the negative features not
of likely to lead to clarification, or communication, if the
one approach, as seen in the Yamal case, or it can be anpeople using it, or those to whom it is directed, are not
numerically sophisticated. The approach worked well with
entirely new method for solving the problem, as in the
decision makers in the Corps of Engineers because they were
Niakuk case. The quantitative approach, though it can

consider other alternatives, does not use their creation as
trained scientists, but what about people in the small villages
of Alaska? No a priori assumptions can be made one way or
a tool in the analysis, nor does it force consideration of
the other.
alternatives. Someone looking for alternatives could use
NDA to locate the largest disadvantages of the existing The non-numerical CDA analysis requires the decisionmaking process to identify and deal with the essential differoptions and try to develop another option based on those

observations.

ences between different options. That is, clarity is achieved

by eliminating factors for which there is no real difference or
The forcing of alternatives can be important in the Arctic:
which are not important to the decision maker, rather than
the unique conditions can call for new solutions to engineertransforming them into numbers as in NDA.
ing problems. One example may be the development of freon-

filled pipeline supports in Alaska. Environmentalists raised
the concern that the originally proposed buried pipeline, orFinding Compromises

even the supports of a raised pipeline, would cause
thermokarsts. The development of the supports solved this NDA deals with single decision makers and their choices
among an existing group of alternatives. As noted under the
problem, and probably saved the pipeline company considerable repair costs. The forcing of an alternative benefited both
consideration of alternatives, it is possible to develop new
the environment and the oil industry.
options from the old options, but they are not part of the
The quantitative approach, on the other hand, allows theanalysis. NDA does allow clearer trade-offs. CDA, in creat-

consideration of compensating actions. Thus, the analysis
ing a new option when noncomparability exists, allows for
may point out that a positive impact outweighs a negative one
the consideration of different interests and can try to create a
in another category. The qualitative approach has no way ofcompromise option based on an analysis of those interests.

considering this trade-off, because it does not attempt Aiding
to
compromise reduces the cost of any decision.
provide the means to cross-compare criteria unless compari-

Favoring Interests
sons can be made in money equivalents. For instance, an
applicant could propose to replace wetland in the project area
by creating wetland of equal or greater value in another area.NDA could favor certain interest groups over others. First,
Compensating actions may be less feasible in the Arctic
NDA requires greater numeracy, at least on the part of the

environment, because slower biological processes would
decision maker. This problem might be overcome with the
lengthen the time needed to create, say, a new wetland development
or
of graphical prompting techniques. These techother biophysical feature.
niques would not ask for numerical evaluations, but rather
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villages of Alaska becoming more involved in impor
whether a series of boxes captures a decision rural
maker's

tant decision making, the analysis method used should be
accessible
However, a second problem would be more difficult
to to people less experienced with numbers. Thus,

thinking on a decision.

CDA
may be most appropriate where a decision analyst does
overcome. The quantitative approach is less able to deal
with
have much
time to work with the decision maker. NDA
a "rights-based" approach to a particular decision. not
Under
a
beits
easier to work with as the length of time available
rights-based approach, a group would not be willing may
to see
increases.
interests traded off against others because those interests
are
based on a legal right. Small groups within larger societies,
Uncertainty
such as Alaska Natives, typically emphasize this approach

because they know that they will not necessarily win a
majority decision. NDA has difficulty dealing withThe
such
approaches deal with uncertainty in very different
thresholds, as it must add another factor to the analysis
ways. The CDA approach, in the Yamal case, looks at the cost
beyond importance, impact, and uncertainty. CDAofcan
deal uncertainty. That is, the qualitative approach
reducing
with it more easily. Taken together, these problems mean
that
translates
uncertainty into a monetary figure. Even if decision
NDA may disfavor smaller groups with lower numerical
makers decide not to pay that cost, it is not an unknown. A
skills who must argue from a position of rights.
public debate can be pursued in which the value of uncer-

tainty carries a concrete figure.
The NDA approach may attempt to estimate the amount of
uncertainty. Here again the decision maker has to be able to
Both methods may be considered improvements over
thinkthe
in quantitative terms to provide an estimate. The payoff

Communication

often confounded discussions surrounding oil and gasis develthat the analysis can derive a single estimate of uncertainty
opment in the Arctic. Simply achieving greater clarity
to goand
with the single estimate of utility . Again, the uncertainty

reducing complexity do, to some extent, provide improved
can be graphically presented. The public debate entrained by
communication. Decisions are more transparent. The
NDA of uncertainty would cover the estimates given
this treatment
approach can present its findings in more graphically
by interthe decision maker.
esting forms because of its numerical base. The research
In did
both cases, the response might be to spend money on
not specifically attempt to measure improvements in research
commuto reduce the uncertainty. Under the CDA approach,
nication, but other regulators who work with the CoE
indi-applicant or a decision maker will have a clear idea
a permit
cated that the analyses were improvements.
as to the opportunity cost of not doing the research. That is,
Ability to Reuse

the analysis can suggest that further research might be justified by cost reduction from not having to provide an engineering solution to the problem. If, for instance, a model could be

As the American permitting case showed, the
NDAto predict accurately the entrance of icebergs into
developed
approach can be applied to a class of decisions.
The
Baydaratskaya Bay, with the result that a ship need be

American researchers' tentative conclusion was that
some
stationed
in the bay only during those times, the value of the
variant of the NDA approach would be useful to regulators
research and the maximum suggested cost would be equal to
as a required format for industry-submitted construction
the cost reduction from periodic rather than constant monitorapplications or as a format for regulators to follow
inNDA approach does not give a dol lar cost in the same
ing. The
making and explaining their own permitting decisions.
way. It does point out more clearly, however, where the issues
(This conclusion needs to be tested in the context
a
lie. of
As uncertainty
makes an impact less desirable, an incen-

regulatory regime, but such testing was outside the
tive scope
exists to improve the precision of figures given.
of this study.) Because a chief characteristic of the CDA
approach is that it reduces the number of criteriaInstitutional
consid- Acceptance of the Methodologies
ered, it is less generalizable. That is, it must approach each
decision anew and adapt its analysis accordingly. Initially, CoE decision makers appeared more comfort-

Ease of Use

able with CDA, but they became more accepting of NDA as

they used it. The CoE has not taken the step of using either
method as a formal part of its permit application procedure.
The CDA approach is easier to use because it employs
This step would probably require review at levels higher than
natural language. The NDA required some learning
theDistrict Office Regulatory Branch.
theon
Alaska
part of the decision makers. Setting the scale (the meaning
of
Two instances
of nonacceptance did arise, however,

the "100" impact) took considerable discussion, andduring
making
the course of research. In both cases, the people failed
a judgement along that scale did not come naturally.
These that the analysis techniques were not intended
to understand

difficulties were encountered with decision makers who
had
as objective
analyses which would support the decision
a scientific background and were comfortable with numbers.
makers' own knowledge and thinking. Nor do the methods
One might well ask whether the difficulties might be
even transform the decision makers' decision into somemagically
greater for people without this kind of background. With
the robust than it already is. The methods do make
thing more
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EXPERT
COMMISSION.
1989. The final assessment on the
subjective decisions more understandable to others
and,
in
this respect, make the decisions more public, if feasibility
not morestudy of Yamal-Baydaratskaya Bay system pipel
construction, Expert Commission conclusions. Moscow: US
objective.
State Committee on Natural Environment and Resources

Management.
CONCLUSIONS

FLANDERS, N.E. 1993. International markets, national security
and local control: Oil in Arctic Alaska. In: Heininen, L., and

eds. Regionalism in the North. Rovaniemi, Finland:
Decision analysis methods differ in how they Katermaa,T.,
address

University
Arctic oil and gas issues. These differences suggest that
such of Lapland. Arctic Centre Reports No. 8. 9-18.
T. 1989. Crisis amid plenty: The politics of Soviet
methods can improve oil and gas decision making, GUSTAFSON,
rendering
energy
under Brezhnev and Gorbachev. Princeton: Princeton
it clearer both to the public and to the decision maker.
Arctic
Press.
resource decisions are public and do need better University
public
HAMM,
1991. Selection of verbal probabilities solution for
understanding. These methods therefore suggest
that R.
im-

some problems of verbal probability expression. Journal of
proved decision analytic methods are an important research

objective.
Arguably, Arctic resource decisions are among the most
thorny environmental issues because of their complexity and
uncertainty. Methods developed for the Arctic may therefore

serve well elsewhere. They may also be applied to several
areas that are not strictly environmental issues, such as
allocating basic scientific research funds. Arctic oil and gas
decision makers must think not just about their decisions, but

about how their decision making might be clarified and
communicated.
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